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STUDENT NoTEs
that "in the light of all that occurred" it could not be doubted that it
was effected. The only thing that occurred after the donor learned
that the gift could not be immediately completed was that he nodded
his head when asked if he wanted the bequest in his will. Also, as
the court points out, he did not ask for the return of the key. He did
absolutely nothing to constitute the attorney and the banker trustees.
Some courts have declared that in cases of doubt the presumption is
that the third person takes as the trustee of the doneen but others
have reached the opposite conclusion." Such a presumption is not
relied on in this case. It is questionable whether or not the donor
ever had the intention that the attorney and the banker be trustees
for the donor. If he still wanted to complete the gift in his lifetime,
he probably thought that he could do it when it was possible to get
the certificate out of the bank. If he no longer had that idea, he
probably thought his will would take care of it.
It really seems that the court holds that a gift was made when
there was not a completed delivery. It is, in effect, saying that all
that is necessary for a gift inter vivos is a clear intention to make the
gift and, when delivery is impossible, some positive act in that direction.
Bsm~rr GmBET.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-A WORKABLE DEFINITION
Although the courts seem to be agreed that criminal negligence
must be something more than the negligence necessary to impose civil
liability for damages,' there is a great diversity of opinion as to what
are the essential ingredients necessary to constitute criminal neg-
ligence. In the final analysis, the question is one which is vague and
unsettled. It is our purpose in this note to attempt to derive a defini-
tion for criminal negligence which will be broad enough to be of use
in the solution of criminal cases.
In the civil field, we find the question of negligence virtually
settled. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R. CO.,2 the court said that "negli-
gence is the absence of care according to the circumstances." In Young
v. Srtate,3 we learn that "negligence is the failure to do what a man of
ordinary care and prudence would do under the same or like circum-
stances. "These definitions have been universally accepted, and courts
in civil cases have no difficulty in incorporating them into their instruc-
tions to the jury. However, since, as we have stated above, criminal
negligence must be something more than ordinary negligence, we can-
not successfully apply this accepted tort definition in criminal cases.
Uniformity of decisions in our courts is highly desirable. Because of
= In re 'White's Estate, 129 Wash. 544, 225 Pac. 415 (1924); Ken-
nedy v. Nelson, 125 Neb. 185, 249 N. W. 546 (1933).
2 Clapper v. Frederick, 199 Pa. -609, 49 Atl. 218 (1901).
'State v. Lester, 127 Minn. 282, 149 N. W. 297 (1914); State v.
McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac. 526, 41 A. L. R. 717 (1925).
2248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
'120 Tex. Cr. Rep. 39, 47 S. W. (2d) 320 (1932).
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this fact, we are faced with the need for a definition of criminal neg-
ligence which is broad enough to be susceptible of application in all
cases.
The task of finding such a definition is a difficult one, because
there has been so little written on this point. In the discussion of this
subject, textbook writers seem to shy away from giving an actual defi-
nition; they are content to merely state the effects of criminal neg
ligence. For the most direct attempts toward a definition, we must
go to the cases. The attempts at definition seem to fall into four gen-
eral classes. The first class defines criminal negligence as "culpable
negligence."4 The second class calls criminal negligence "willful and
wanton disregard."5 In the third division we find the courts saying
that criminal negligence is synonymous with "reckless disregard."
In the fourth class criminal negligence is said to be "gross negligence."
In order for us to derive our definition, we must examine each of the
above classes and draw a generalization.
In Peole v. Waxman,8 the court said, "To establish culpable neg-
ligence, the evidence must show that the defendant disregarded the
consequences which might ensue from his act and indifference to the
rights of others." In Clark v. State,' the court defined culpable neg-
ligence as "the omission to do something which a reasonable, prudent,
and honest man would do, or the doing of something which such a man
would not do, under the circumstances surrounding the particular
case." All the cases which say that criminal negligence is culpable
negligence seem to follow these definitions. In short, the culpable
negligence necessary to render one criminally liable seems to be tanta-
mount to gross carelessness or recklessness incompatible with proper
regard for human life.
Next we consider the group of cases which call criminal negligence
a willful and wanton disregard. In Ziman v. Whitley," the court, in
defining a wanton act, said: "A wanton act is one done in reckless
disregard of the rights of others, evincing a reckless indifference to
the consequences to life, or limb, or health, or property rights of an-
' People v. Seiler, 57 Cal. App. 195, 207 Pac. 396 (1922); State v.
Irvine et al., 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567 (1910); State v. Lester, supra,
n. 1; Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N. W. 927 (1911); Clark v. State,
27 Okl. Cr. 11, 224 Pac. 738 (1924).
5 Carbo v. State, 4 Ga. App. 583, 62 S. E. 140 (1908); People v.
Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N. E. 575 (19-19); People v. Schwartz, 298 Ill.
218, 131 N. E. 806 (1921); Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281
S. W. 164 (1926); People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N. W. 97
(1927).
0 People v. Driggs, 111 Cal. App. 42, 295 Pac. 51 (1931); People v.
Herkless, 361 Ill. 32, 196 N. E. 829 (1935); Schultz v. State, supra, n.
4; State v. Agnew, 202 N. C. 755, 164 S. E. 578 (1932).
7 State v. Goetz, 83 Conn. 437, 76 Atl. 1000 (1910); People v. Adams,
supra, n. 5; Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, n. 5.
9249 N. Y. S. 180 (1930). See also N. Y. Penal Law, Sec. 244,
Subd. 2.
9 Supra, n. 4.
10 110 Conn. 108, 147 At. 370 (1929).
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other, and is more than negligence, more than gross negligence, and is
such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or
safety of others." In People v. Adams,n the court said: "Wanton neg-
ligence implies a positive disregard of the rules of diligence and a
reckless heedlessness of consequences." Willful negligence may be
defined as "such conduct as evidences a reckless indifference to safety."n2
So we may conclude that willful and wanton disregard is synonymous
with the reckless disregard spoken of by the courts in our third class
of cases.
Gross negligence is the "omission of that care which even inat-
tentive and thoughtless men never fail to exercise." 3 The court in
People v. Adams 4 tells us that "gross negligence borders on reckless-
ness." In a civil case, Craig v. McAtee," the court said that gross neg-
ligence does not establish a rule of liability varying appreciably from
reckless disregard.
All of these definitions, while they are phrased differently, seem to
have at least one point in common: that to constitute criminal neg-
ligence, an act or omission must be evidence of a reckless disregard of
consequences which will result from such act or omission.
Realizing that a one sentence definition, to be of any use, must
be very broad, in order to cover all circumstances, it is with a great
deal of hesitation that we submit for criticism the following definition,
because in our effort to make the definition broad we may have exceeded
the limit and made it too broad. However, with all the definitions and
explanations which have been discussed above in mind, we submit the
following, which we consider to be a workable definition for criminal
negligence: Criminal Negligence is abnormally dangerous conduct of
such a nature as to indicate under all the circumstances, a reckless
disregard for human life and safety. We believe that this definition
embodies all of the characteristics of criminal negligence set out in the
cases which we have considered.
The adoption of a definition similar to the one proposed, would be
valuable not only in promoting a greater uniformity of decisions, but
also in providing a standard part of the court's instructions to the
jury. This would make for fewer reversals on appeal because of
erroneous instructions. Pmnxw ScRW.
LIVING APART WITHOUT COHABITATION AS A GROUND FOR
DIVORCE UNDER KENTUCKY LAW
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes' provides that, "Living apart without
any cohabitation for five years next before application" is ground for
divorce "... to both husband and wife". A similar provision is found in
n Supra, n. 5.
" Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N. W. 42
(1928).
"Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 15 L. Ed. 934 (1857).
"Supra, n. 5.
160 Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146 (1931).
